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EQUALITY, INFANCY AND EFFICIENCY 





This policy paper deals with the annual allocation of faculty funds to academic staff 
members for supporting research related activities such as conference attendance, 
subscription to journals, submission of papers to refereed journals charging fees, purchase 
of software, etc.  
 
Equal allocation is a computationally convenient scheme and is also likely to be supported 
by a blocking coalition of faculty members when research performance is unequally non- 
symmetrically distributed with a mode and a median that are significantly smaller than the 
mean. Unsurprisingly, equal allocation is frequently applied in allocating internal funds 
among faculty members for supporting the aforementioned research related activities.  
 
However, equal allocation presents no consideration for efficiency and does not provide 
desirable signals to faculty members. (See also Levy, 1993.) When the budget is small, it 
insufficiently rewards devoted, productive researchers and excessively rewards non 
devoted, or unsuccessful, faculty members.  
 
Based on the principles of: 
Equality    - a lump-sum portion and open access,  
Infancy      - support for new starters, and  
Efficiency  - research output’s quality, quantity and share  
 
(abbreviated EIE) an EIE research-fund-allocation scheme is constructed and proposed in 
the following sections. Section II presents the EIE allocation scheme. Section III 
incorporates a fix degree of inequality aversion into the EIE allocation scheme. Section IV 
proposes a formula for computing members’ research output scores that takes into 
account quality, quantity and contribution aspects. Section V recommends. 
 
 
II. An EIE Allocation Scheme 
 
The proposed EIE allocation scheme employs the following notations: 
 
i i , '= faculty academic staff member indexes, i i M , ' , , ,..., = 12 3 , where  M is the number of 
the faculty academic staff members; 
 
Xi =the research output score of the i-th academic staff member during the last period of 
years; 
   2
Di = a dummy variable indicating whether the i-th academic staff member is a new starter 
(1) or veteran (0); 
 
Yi  = the annual fund allocated to the i-th academic staff member by the faculty; 
 
B  = the faculty budget for supporting academic staff members’ research oriented travels, 
subscription, purchase of research related items, etc.; 
 
a  = an equal annual lump sum allocated by the faculty to all academic staff members 
regardless of performance and their research experience; 
 
b  =  an additional equal annual lump sum allocated by the faculty to new starters; and 
 
g  =  the nominal value of a point in the publication score (that is, the amount of fund 
given by the faculty for a point of  X ). 
 
 
It is proposed that the allocation of faculty funds to individual members will include a 
general lump s um, an exclusive lump sum supplement to new starters, and a variable 
portion that awards members in accordance with their research output over the last period 
of years: 
 
Y D X i i i = + + a b g .                  (1) 
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.                (3) 
 
By substituting Eq. (3) into Eq. (1), the proposed formula for allocating annual faculty 
fund to academic staff members is rendered as a combination of a general lump sum, a 
new-starter lump sum, and a reward for their shares in the faculty’s aggregate research 
output:  
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III. Incorporating a Fix Inequality Aversion into the EIE Allocation Scheme 
 
It is suggested that a fraction  0 1 < < f  of the annual faculty budget for supporting 
academic staff members’ research related activities will be allocated by equality and 
infancy criteria: 
 







.                  (5) 
 
The fraction  f   is predetermined and represents the degree of inequality aversion. For 
instance, indifference between equality and efficiency in fund allocation is displayed by 
f = 05 . .  
 
Fixing the budget share allocated by non-efficiency considerations, the extra lump sum 
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1 .           (7) 
 
 
IV. Individual Research Output Score’s ( Xi ) Formula 
 
The proposed research output score formula takes into account quality, quantity and 
contribution aspects by differentiating among 14 (or more) types of research output, 
assigning different values for different types or research output, deflating these values by 
the number of authors, adding a principal-author bonus and subtracting a minor-author 
levy. Research output is classified into:   4
 
4 different quality categories of Refereed Journal Articles (RJA1  - RJA4 in 
descending rank),   
2  (or more) different quality categories of Authored Research Books (RB1, RB2 
in descending rank), 
2 (or more) different quality categories of Edited Research Books/Volumes 
(ERB1, ERB2 in descending rank), 
2 (or more) different quality categories of Chapters in edited research 
books/volumes (C1, C2 in descending rank), 
2 (or more) different quality categories of  Proceedings (D1, D2 in descending 
rank), 
Working Papers (W), and  
Seminar Papers (S) 
 
The values (points) assigned to these 14 research-output types are indicated by 
p p 1 14 ,..., . They are deflated by the number of authorsN , increased by a principal-author 
(F=1, zero otherwise) bonus ofp  percentage point, and reduced by a minor-author (L=1, 
zero otherwise) levy of d  percentage point. 
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1. As it is difficult to compare quality of journals and their rates of rejection as well as the 
importance of other research-output outlays across disciplines, it is recommended that the 
EIE research fund allocation scheme consisting of Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) will be applied in 
each discipline independently from the other disciplines. 
 
2. Discipline Parity: The share of each discipline in the faculty budget will be equal to its 
academic staff share in the faculty. 
 
3. Each discipline will decide on the ranking of the various types of research outputs and 
their values ( p p 1 14 ,..., ). 
 
4. Special high values will be attached to papers published in top and second rank refereed 
journal and to authored research books published by well-known publishing houses.  
 
5. The principal-author bonus will be one tenth (p = 01 . ) making the share of the first 
author 0.6 in the case of two authors, 0.433 in the case of 3 authors, 0.35 in the case of 4 
authors, etc. Similarly, the minor-author levy will be one fifth (d = 01 .  ) making the share 
of the minor authors 0.3 in the case of two authors, 0.233 in the case of three authors, 
0.150 in the case of four authors, 0.10 in the case of five authors, 0.066 in the case of six 
authors, and (set to be) zero in the case of seven or more authors. 
 
6. The inequality-aversion degree  f    will be gradually reduced from the present level 
(e.g.,f = 1 where equal allocation applies) to the level reflecting equal weights for both 
equality and efficiency considerations ( f = 05 . ) over a period of three years (e.g., 
f1 08333 = . ,  f2 06666 = . ,  f3 05 = . ) so as to allow members to adjust to the new 
allocation scheme. 
  
7. The individual’s research output score ( Xi ) will be computed with data on the last five 
years. A shorter period, say three years, might be insufficient for members investing huge 
effort in producing high-quality output and exposed to a high degree of uncertainty   6
(rejection), and therefore might divert excessive effort to mass production of law-quality 
research. 
 
8. Consistently with the previous recommendation, new starters will have five-year grace 
with supplementary lump sum (b ). 
 
9. Transparency: The allocation scheme, Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), will be disclosed and 
explained to faculty members. 
 
10. Anonymity: Each member will receive a report containing his, or her, funding level and 
share and research-output score and share. This information will not be disclosed to other 
faculty members. The distribution of  research scores and funds and the associated degrees 
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